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Abstract. Machine learning models have achieved spectacular performances in
various critical fields including intelligent monitoring, autonomous driving and
malware detection. Therefore, robustness against adversarial attacks represents a
key issue to trust these models. In particular, the Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA) is widely used to fool neural network classifiers. In this paper,
we introduce Weighted JSMA (WJSMA) and Taylor JSMA (TJSMA), simple,
faster and more efficient versions of JSMA. These attacks rely upon new saliency
maps involving the neural network Jacobian, its output probabilities and the in-
put features. We demonstrate the advantages of WJSMA and TJSMA through
two computer vision applications on 1) LeNet-5, a well-known Neural Network
classifier (NNC), on the MNIST database and on 2) a more challenging NNC on
the CIFAR-10 dataset. We obtain that WJSMA and TJSMA significantly outper-
form JSMA in success rate, speed and average number of changed features. For
instance, on LeNet-5 (with 100% and 99.49% accuracies on the training and test
sets), WJSMA and TJSMA respectively exceed 97% and 98.60% in success rate
for a maximum authorised distortion of 14.5%, outperforming JSMA with more
than 9.5 and 11 percentage points 3. The new attacks are then used to defend and
create more robust models than those trained against JSMA. Like JSMA, our at-
tacks are not scalable on large datasets such as IMAGENET but despite this fact,
they remain attractive for relatively small datasets like MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
may be potential tools for future applications.
Keywords: Jacobian-based Saliency Map, Adversarial Attacks, Deep Neural Net-
works, MNIST, CIFAR-10.
1 Introduction
Deep learning classifiers are used in a wide variety of situations, such as vision,
speech recognition, financial fraud detection, malware detection, autonomous
driving, defence, and more.
3 To avoid confusion, we explain in the paper that our results do not contradict [15], achieving a
success rate of 97% on LeNet-5 but with a less performant model than ours. More discussions
regarding this point can be found in Section 6. Codes and paper are under review.
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The ubiquity of deep learning algorithms in many applications, especially
those that are critical such as autonomous driving [4,20] or pertain to security
and privacy [17,21] makes their attack particularly useful. Indeed, this allows
firstly to identify possible flaws in the intelligent learned system and secondly
set up a defense strategy to improve its reliability.
In this context, adversarial machine learning has appeared as a new branch
that aims to thwart intelligent algorithms. Many techniques called adversarial
attacks succeeded in fooling well-known architectures of machine learning al-
gorithms, sometimes in an astonishing way. Examples of adversarial attacks
include but are not limited to: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5], Basic It-
erative Method (IBM) [8], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [12], JSMA [15],
DeepFool [13], Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAP) [14] and Carlini-
Wagner (CW) attacks [1].
Adversarial attacks are built upon the idea of adversarial samples. Given a
classifierN and an input x with label l, an adversarial sample to x is an input x∗
close to x but such that label(x∗) 6= l. These attacks can be separated into two
types: targeted and non-targeted depending on whether label(x∗) is specified in
advance or not.
In this paper, we focus on JSMA, a simple, reliable and intuitive targeted
adversarial attack against machine learning classifiers. Despite the fact it does
not scale to large datasets like IMAGENET [3], JSMA is still relevant on small
datasets such as MNIST [10], CIFAR-10 [7], Fashion-MNIST [25] achieving
good results on these datasets [15,6,24]. Relying on its cleverhans implemen-
tation [16], JSMA is able to generate 9 adversarial samples on MNIST in only 2
seconds on a laptop with 2 CPU cores. The combination between good perfor-
mance and speed makes JSMA attractive although it is less efficient than CW
attack which is 20 times slower [1]. In multiple other applications in cybersecu-
rity, anomaly detection, intrusion detection and Reinforcement Learning involv-
ing small data, JSMA may be preferred over many approaches [18,2,19,11].
Before explaining our contribution, let us introduce some definitions and
recall the principle of JSMA.
Neural network classifier (NNC). The goal of a NNC is to predict through
a neural network which class an item x belongs to, among a family ofK possible
classes. It outputs a vector of probabilities p(x) = (p1(x), · · · , pK(x)) where
the label of x is deduced as follows: label(x) = argmaxkpk(x).
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). To fool NNCs, this attack
relies on the Jacobian matrix of outputs with respect to inputs. By analysing
this matrix, one can deduce how the output probabilities behave given a slight
modification of an input feature. Consider a NNC N as before and denote by
F (x) = (F1(x), · · · , FK(x)) the outputs of the second-to-last layer of N (no
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longer probabilities, but related to the final output by applying a softmax layer).
To craft an adversarial example from a given input x, JSMA first computes the
gradient ∇F (x). The next step is constructing a saliency map whose role is to
select the most relevant component i to perturb:
S[x, t][i] =

0 if
∂Ft(x)
∂xi
< 0 or
∑
k 6=t
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
> 0
∂Ft(x)
∂xi
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=t
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ otherwise.
(1)
Note the role of
∂Ft(x)
∂xi
and
∑
k 6=t
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
which is to increase Ft(x) and de-
crease
∑
k 6=t
Fk(x). Working with the Fk’s instead of the probabilities pk has been
justified in [15] by the extreme variations introduced by the logistic regression.
Then the algorithm selects the component:
imax = argmaxiS[x, t][i]. (2)
and augment ximax with a default increase value θ: ximax ← ximax + θ, clipped to
the domain of features values.
In a more advanced form, JSMA selects pairs of components (imax, jmax)
using doubly indexed saliency maps recalled later in the paper.
Contributions. We introduce two new adversarial attacks:
(1) Weighted JSMA (WJSMA): This attack follows the mechanism of JSMA
but “rectifies” it by weighting gradients by the respective probabilities of
classes. The advantage of this fine-tuning is to reduce the impact of gradients
associated with small output probabilities.
(2) Taylor JSMA (TJSMA): It takes into account the output probabilities as
WJSMA and additionally penalises the gradients by θmax−xk to encourage
the selection of input features that are not close to θmax.
We give justifications of WJSMA and TJSMA and experimentally demonstrate
they give significantly better results than JSMA. Two illustrations will be con-
sidered by targeting the LeNet-5 [9] model on MNIST and a variant of All
Convolutional Net [22] on CIFAR-10.
Figures 1 and 2 show examples of targeted adversarial samples generated
by the three attacks JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA from an MNIST 0 image and
a CIFAR-10 car image, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Original image with label 0 and its adversarial samples generated by
JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA (from top to bottom).
Fig. 2: Adversarial examples crafted by JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA on a car
image
At first glance, samples provided by WJSMA and TJSMA look less noisy
and closer to the original images than those generated by JSMA.
In addition to attacks, we present an application to defense. It essentially
demonstrates that defending against WJSMA or TJSMA makes the NNC more
robust against JSMA while defending against JSMA has less impact on the per-
formances of WJSMA and TJSMA.
2 Weighted Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (WJSMA)
This section presents WJSMA, the first contribution of the paper, its motivation
and mathematical argumentation.
Motivating example. Assume a number of classes K ≥ 4 and for some
input x: p1(x) = 0.5, p2(x) = 0.49, p3(x) = 0.01 and pk(x) = 0 for all
4 ≤ k ≤ K. Consider the problem of generating an adversarial sample to
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x with target label t = 2. In order to decrease
∑
k 6=2
Fk(x), the first iteration
step of JSMA relies on the gradients ∇Fk(x), k 6= 2. The main observation
is that as the probabilities pk(x) = 0 for 4 ≤ k ≤ K are already in their
minimal values, the consideration of∇Fk(x) for these values of k in the search
of imax is unnecessary. In other words, by acting only on gradients of the second-
to-last layer, JSMA does not consider the crucial constraints on probabilities:
pk(x) ≥ 0. Moreover, the possible decrease for p1(x) is high (up to 0.5) and,
as p3(x) is relatively small, it will be hard to decrease further. In this situation,
intuitively, instead of relying equally on ∇F1(x) and ∇F3(x), one would “ bet
more ” on∇F1(x) than ∇F3(x).
To address the previous issue, WJSMA relies on new saliency maps derived
quite naturally from the classical log softmax reasoning. First, we compute the
derivative:
∂
∂xi
log pt(x) = = (1− pt(x))∂Ft
∂xi
(x)−
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)
∂Fk
∂xi
(x) (3)
with t standing for the targeted class. This formula is separated as A − B,
where A only depends on the targeted class and B depends on the other classes.
To maximise this quantity, one can consider maximising A and minimising B
independently by imposing the constraints A > 0 and B < 0. Note that, unlike
JSMA, these constraints ensure that
∂pt
∂xi
(x) remains positive. This allows us to
introduce weighted saliency maps depending on one component as follows:
SW [x, t][i] =

0 if
∂Ft(x)
∂xi
< 0 or
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
> 0
∂Ft(x)
∂xi
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)
∂Fk(x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ otherwise.
(4)
Based on these maps, we present Algorithm 1, the first version of WJSMA
that generates targeted adversarial samples.
When the output x∗ of Algorithm 1 satisfies class(x∗) = t, the attack is
considered as successful.
To relax a bit the search of relevant components and motivated by an appli-
cation to computer vision, Papernot et al. [15] introduced saliency maps indexed
by pairs of components. Their main observation is that the conditions required
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Algorithm 1 Generating adversarial samples by WJSMA: version 1
Inputs: N : a NNC, F : second-to-last output of N , x: input to N , t: target label (t 6= class(x)),
maxIter: maximum number of iterations, θmin, θmax lower and upper bounds for features values,
θ: positive default increase value.
Output: x∗: adversarial sample to x.
x∗ ← x
iter← 0
Γ ← J1, |x|K \ {p ∈ J1, |x|K | x[p] = θmax}
while class(x∗) 6= t and iter < maxIter and Γ 6= ∅ do
pmax = argmaxp∈Γ S
W [x∗, t](p)
Modify x∗ by x∗[pmax] = Clip[θmin,θmax](x
∗[pmax]+ θ) //Clip is the clipping function
Remove pmax from Γ
iter++
end while
return x∗
in S[x, t][i] (1) may be too severe for some applications and very few compo-
nents will verify it. By replicating the same one-component WJSMA reasoning,
we introduce weighted versions of doubly indexed saliency maps SW [x, t][i, j]
as follows:
SW [x, t][i, j] =

0 if
∑
a∈{i,j}
∂Ft(x)
∂xa
< 0 or
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)
∑
a∈{i,j}
∂Fk(x)
∂xa
> 0
∑
a∈{i,j}
∂Ft(x)
∂xa
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)
∑
a∈{i,j}
∂Ft(x)
∂xa
∣∣∣∣∣∣ otherwise.
(5)
Based on these maps, we present Algorithm 2, the second version of WJSMA
that generates targeted adversarial samples by operating on pairs of components.
In the two previous algorithms, the selected components are always aug-
mented by a positive default value, i.e. features are increased. It is possible to
deduce two versions of Algorithms 1 and 2 where relevant components are se-
lected and then decreased according to a similar logic.
3 Taylor Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (TJSMA)
This section presents Taylor JSMA, the second contribution of this paper. The
idea of this attack is to additionally penalise the choice of feature components
that are close the maximum value of features θmax and favour components that
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Algorithm 2 Generating adversarial samples by WJSMA: version 2
Inputs: Same inputs as Algorithm 1.
Output: x∗: adversarial sample to x.
x∗ ← x
iter← 0
Γ ← {(p, q), p, q ∈ J1, |x|K, x[p] 6= θmax, x[q] 6= θmax}
while class(x∗) 6= t and iter < maxIter and Γ 6= ∅ do
(pmax, qmax) = argmaxp,q∈ΓS
W [x∗, t](p, q)
Modify x∗ by x∗[a] = Clip[θmin,θmax(x
∗[a] + θ), a = pmax, pmax
Remove (pmax, qmax) from Γ
iter++
end while
return x∗
are more distant from θmax. As a motivating situation, assume two components
i and j have the same WJSMA score SW [x, t][i] and SW [x, t][j] and that xi
is very close to θmax, while xj is far enough from θmax. In this case, searching
for more impact, our saliency maps prefer xj over xi. Concretely, we consider
maximising the two scores: S1 = θmax − xi and S2 = ∂
∂xi
log pt(x) which is
translated into maximising S = S1S2.
Accordingly, we introduce new saliency maps for one- and two-components
attacks as follows.
ST [x, t][i] =
{
0 if αi < 0 or βi > 0
αi|βi| otherwise.
(6)
where
αi = (θmax − xi)∂Fc(x)
∂xi
, βi =
∑
k 6=t
pk(x)(θmax − xi)∂Fk(x)
∂xi
and
ST [x, t][i, j] =
{
0 if αi,j < 0 or βi,j > 0
αi,j |βi,j | otherwise.
(7)
where
αi,j =
∑
a∈{i,j}
(θmax − xa)∂Ft(x)
∂xa
, βi,j =
∑
k 6=t
∑
a∈{i,j}
pk(x)(θmax − xa)∂Fk(x)
∂xa
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We call these maps Taylor saliency maps because of the Taylor terms (θmax−
xa)
∂Fk(x)
∂xa
. One and two-components TJSMA follow exactly Algorithms 1 and
2 with only SW replaced with ST .
(a) Origin class (b) Target class
Fig. 3: Evolution of the origin and target class probabilities till the target class
is reached for JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA changing the image of a one into a
five.
Through Figures 3a and 3b, we observe that WJSMA and TJSMA decrease/increase
the predicted/targeted probability of the original/targeted class much sooner
than JSMA. In this example, it is worth noting how TJSMA behaves like WJSMA
until it is able to find a more vulnerable component that makes it converge much
faster.
4 Experiments
In the following, we give attacks and defense applications to illustrate the in-
terest of WJSMA and TJSMA over JSMA. In doing so, we compare WJSMA
and TJSMA and report better results for TJSMA despite that for a large part of
samples WJSMA outperforms TJSMA. We use the following standard datasets:
MNIST [10]. This dataset contains 70,000 28 × 28 greyscale images in
10 classes, divided into 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images. The
possible classes are digits from 0 to 9.
CIFAR-10 [7]. This dataset contains 60,000 32×32×3 RGB images. There
are 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. These images are divided
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into 10 different classes (airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse,
ship, truck), with 6,000 images per class.
Figures 4 and 5 display one sample per class, from MNIST and CIFAR-10
respectively.
Fig. 4: MNIST image examples
Fig. 5: CIFAR-10 image examples
On each dataset, a deep neural network classifier (DNN) is trained and the
performances of the three attacks are evaluated on it.
DNN on MNIST. For the first experiment, we use LeNet-5 [9,15], whose
architecture is given in the supplementary material.
We implement and train this model using a cleverhans model that opti-
mises crafting adversarial examples. The number of epochs is fixed to 20, the
batch-size to 128, the learning rate to 0.001 and the Adam optimizer is used.
Training results in a 100% accuracy on the training dataset and 99.49% accu-
racy on the test dataset.
DNN on CIFAR-10. For the second experiment, a more complex DNN is
trained to reach a good performance on CIFAR-10 which is more challenging
than MNIST. Its architecture is inspired by the AllConvolutional model pro-
posed in cleverhans and is described in the supplementary material..
Likewise, this model is implemented and trained using cleverhans for 10
epochs, with a batch size of 128, a learning rate of 0.001 and the Adam opti-
mizer. Training results in a 99.96% accuracy on the training dataset and 83.81%
accuracy on the test dataset.
To compare our results with [15], we use the original implementation of
JSMA available in cleverhans. We have also adapted the code to WJSMA
and TJSMA obtaining fast implementations of these two attacks. We only test
9
the attacks (i.e. Algorithm 2 in the three formats: original, weighted and Taylor)
on samples that are correctly predicted by their respective neural networks. In
this way, the attacks are applied to the whole training set and the 9,949 well-
predicted images of the MNIST test dataset. Similarly, CIFAR-10 adversarial
examples are crafted from the well-predicted 9,995 images of the first training
10,000 images and the 8,381 well-predicted test images.
To compare the three attacks, we rely on the notion of maximum distor-
tion of adversarial samples defined as the ratio of altered components to the
total number of components. Following [15], we choose a maximum distor-
tion of γ = 14.5% on the adversarial samples from MNIST, corresponding to
maxIter = b784∗γ2∗100 c. On CIFAR-10, we fix γ = 3.7% in order to have the same
maximum number of iterations for both experiments. This allows a comparison
between the attacks in two different settings. Furthermore, for both experiments,
we set θ = 1 (note that θmin = 0, θmax = 1).
We report the metrics:
(1) Success rate: This is the percentage of successful adversarial examples, i.e
crafted before reaching the maximal number of iterations maxIter,
(2) Mean L0 distance: This is the average number of altered components of the
successful adversarial examples,
(3) Strict dominance of an attack: Percentage of adversarial attacks for which
this attack does strictly less iterations than the two other attacks4,
(4) Run-time of an attack on a set of samples targeting every possible class.
Results on the metrics (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1 for MNIST and Table 2
for CIFAR-10.
Table 1: Comparison between JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA on MNIST.
Metric JSMA WJSMA TJSMA
Targeted (Training dataset: Nb of well predicted images=60,000)
Success rate 87.68% 97.14% 98.66%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 44.34 37.86 35.22
Targeted (Test dataset: Nb of well predicted images=9,949))
Success rate 87.34% 96.98% 98.68%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 44.63 38.10 35.50
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Table 2: Comparison between JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA on CIFAR-10.
Metric JSMA WJSMA TJSMA
Targeted (Training dataset: Nb of well predicted images=9 995)
Success rate 86.17 95.91% 97.40%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 47 38.54 36.86
Targeted (Test dataset: Nb of well predicted images=8 381))
Success rate 84.91 94.99% 96.96%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 46.13 38.82 37.45
Overall, WJSMA and TJSMA significantly outperform JSMA according to
the metrics (1)-(2).
On MNIST. Results in terms of success rate are quite remarkable for WJSMA
and TJSMA respectively outperforming JSMA with near 9.46, 10.98 percentage
points (pp) on the training set and 9.46, 11.34 pp on the test set. The gain in the
average number of altered components exceeds 6 components for WJSMA and
9 components for TJSMA in both experiments.
On CIFAR-10. Similar results are obtained on this dataset. WJSMA and
TJSMA outperform JSMA in success rate by near 9.74, 11.23 pp on the training
set and more than 10, 12 pp on the test set. For both training and test sets, we
report better mean L0 distances exceeding 7 features in all cases and up to 10.14
features for TJSMA on the training set.
Dominance of the attacks. The next figures illustrate the (strict) dominance
of the attacks for the two experiments. In these statistics, we do not count the
samples for which TJSMA and WJSMA realise the same number of iterations
strictly less than JSMA.
4 In the supplementary material, we give more statistics on the dominance between any two
attacks.
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 6: Distribution of the (strict) dominance of JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA
over the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets (training and test sets included)
For both experiments, TJSMA has a noteworthy advantage over WJSMA
and JSMA. The advantage of WJSMA over JSMA is also considerable. This
shows that, in most cases, WJSMA and TJSMA craft better adversarial exam-
ples than JSMA, while being faster. Our results are actually better when directly
comparing WJSMA or TJSMA with JSMA. As additional results, we give in the
supplementary material the statistics for the pairwise dominance between the at-
tacks. As it might be expected, both WJSMA and TJSMA dominate JSMA and
TJSMA dominate WJSMA.
Run-time comparison. In order to have a meaningful speed comparison be-
tween the three attacks, we evaluated the run-time needed for each attack to
successfully craft the first 1,000 test images of MNIST in the targeted mode.
Results shown in Table 3 reveal that TJSMA and WJSMA are 1.41 and 1.28
times faster than JSMA. These performance tests were realised on a machine
equipped with a Intel Xeon 6126 processor and a Nvidia Tesla P100 graphics
processor. Based on a previous analysis [1], TJSMA and WJSMA are at least 28
and 24 times faster than L0 CW attack. Note that for WJSMA and TJSMA, the
additional computations of one iteration compared to JSMA are negligible (sim-
ple multiplications). Thus the difference in speed between the attacks is mainly
due to the number of iterations for each attack.
Table 3: Time comparison between JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA
Attack JSMA WJSMA TJSMA
Time (second) 3964 3092 2797
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Note that to compare the attacks, the adversarial samples were crafted one
by one. In practice, it is possible to generate samples by batch. In this case, the
algorithm stops when all samples are treated. Most of the time, with a batch of
large size, the three attacks approximately take the same time to converge. For
example, on the same machine as previously, with a batch size equal 1000, we
were able to craft the same amount of samples in about 250s, for all the attacks.
5 Defense
The objective of this section is to train neural networks in a way that the attacks
fail as much as possible. One way of doing that is by adding adversarial samples
crafted by JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA to the training set. This way of training
may imply a decrease in the model accuracy but adversarial examples will be
more difficult to generate.
We experiment with this idea on MNIST with LeNet-5 in every possible
configuration. To this end, 2,000 adversarial samples per class (20,000 more
images in total), with distortion under 14.5%, are added to the original MNIST
training set, crafted by either JSMA, WJSMA or TJSMA. Then, three dis-
tinct models are trained on these three augmented datasets. The models roughly
achieve an accuracy of 99.9% on the training set and 99.3% on the test set,
showing a slight loss compared to our previous MNIST model accuracy. Never-
theless, the obtained neural networks are more robust to the attacks as shown in
the following Table 4. Note that each experiment is made over the well-predicted
samples of the test images. For each model and image, nine adversarial exam-
ples are generated by the three attacks.
Table 4: Metrics (1) and (2) on JSMA, WJSMA and TJSMA augmented sets
Metric JSMA WJSMA TJSMA
Model trained over JSMA augmented set (9940 well predicted samples)
Success rate 77.94% 84.79% 85.08%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 54.48 52.66 52.83
Model trained over WJSMA augmented set (9936 well predicted samples)
Success rate 77.61% 90.05% 92.01%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 56.29 52.72 52.18
Model trained over TJSMA augmented set (9991 well predicted samples)
Success rate 76.42% 86.18% 87.36%
Mean L0 distance on successful samples 54.26 54.20 54.49
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Overall, the attacks are less efficient on each of these models, compared to
Table 1. The success rates drop by about 8pp, whereas the number of iterations
is increased by approximately 26%. From the defender’s point of view, networks
trained against JSMA and TJSMA give the best performance. The JSMA trained
model provides the lowest success rates while the TJSMA trained network is
more robust from the L0 distance point of view. From the attacker’s point of
view, TJSMA remains the most efficient attack of the three regardless of the
augmented dataset used.
6 Avoid confusion
In this section, we argue that our results do not contradict [15]. First, we stress
that we use a more performant LeNet-5 model than the one in [15] (with 98.93%
and 99.41% accuracies on the training and test sets). For completeness, we also
generated a less performant model (with 99.34% and 98.94% accuracies on the
training and test sets) and evaluated the three attacks on it through the first 1, 000
test MNIST images. We obtain 96.7% success rate for JSMA (very similar to
[15]) and more than 99.5% for WJSMA and TJSMA. These results are also
included in our experiments. Instead of presenting two models, we preferred to
use the more performant one as this makes the paper shorter and moreover it
values more our approach (giving us more advantage with respect to JSMA).
Finally, we notice that for both experiments and contrary to [15] (see Appendix
A in [15]), our results were obtained without simplifications on the model which
is an additional advantage of our attacks.
7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced WJSMA and TJSMA new probabilistic adversarial
attacks variants of JSMA. It has demonstrated that WJSMA and TJSMA signifi-
cantly outperform JSMA on two standard DNNs on MNIST and CIFAR-10 after
analysing more than 88, 200 × 9 adversarial images. Also, it has demonstrated
that defending against WJSMA and TJSMA is more advantageous than against
JSMA. It is important to recall that our attacks are derived quite naturally from
a classical log softmax reasoning and benefit from substantial investigations of
doubly-indexed saliency maps. Based on the analysis of 9,000 adversarial sam-
ples, WJSMA and TJSMA are at least 1.2 and 1.4 times faster than JSMA and
accordingly at least 24 and 28 times faster than L0 CW attack. We believe these
results are quite reassuring and make the new attacks as promising tools for
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future applications. Finally, non-targeted versions of our attacks have not been
discussed in this paper and may be subject of future work and comparison with
existing approaches such as [23].
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8 Supplementary material
Architectures of the DNNs.
Table 5: LeNet-5 architecture
Layer Parameters
Input Layer size: (28× 28)
Conv2D kernel size: (5× 5), 20 kernels, no stride
ReLu
MaxPooling2D kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Conv2D kernel size: (5× 5), 50 kernels, no stride
ReLu
MaxPooling2D kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Flatten
Dense size: 500
ReLu
Dense size: number of classes (10 for MNIST)
Softmax
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Table 6: Architecture of the used DNN on CIFAR-10
Layer Parameters
Input Layer size: (32× 32)
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 64 kernels, no stride
ReLu
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 128 kernels, no stride
ReLu
MaxPooling2D kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 128 kernels, no stride
ReLu
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 256 kernels, no stride
ReLu
MaxPooling2D kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 256 kernels, no stride
ReLu
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 512 kernels, no stride
ReLu
MaxPooling2D kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Conv2D kernel size: (3× 3), 10 kernels, no stride
GlobalAveragePooling kernel size: (2× 2), stride: (2× 2)
Softmax
Pairwise dominance.
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(a) WJSMA vs JSMA (b) TJSMA vs JSMA
(c) TJSMA vs WJSMA
Fig. 7: Pairwise dominance on MNIST (= corresponds to samples with the same
number of iterations by the attacks including when both attacks fail).
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(a) JSMA vs WJSMA (b) JSMA vs TJSMA
(c) WJSMA vs TJSMA
Fig. 8: Pairwise dominance on CIFAR-10 (= has the same significance as be-
fore).
Supplementary comments. Further analysis of the results on MNIST re-
veals that, even for examples where JSMA is better than WJSMA or TJSMA,
in average, less than 10 more components are changed by WJSMA or TJSMA,
whereas JSMA changes more than 17 more components in average when it is
dominated by WJSMA or TJSMA. A similar gap can be remarked in CIFAR-10.
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